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Abstract
We analyze the interplay between policies aimed to control global and local pollution such as
greenhouse gases and particulate matter. The two types of pollution interact in the abatement cost
function of the polluting rms through economies or diseconomies of scope. They are regulated
by distinct entities (global versus local), potentially with di¤erent instruments that are designed
according to some specic agenda. We show that the choice of regulatory instrument and the
timing of the regulations matter for e¢ ciency. Emissions of local pollution are distorted if the
local regulators anticipate that global pollution will later be regulated through emission caps. The
regulation is too (not enough) stringent when abatement e¤orts exhibit economies (diseconomies)
of scope. In contrast, we obtain e¢ ciency if the global pollutant is regulated by tax provided that
the revenues from taxing emissions are redistributed to the local communities in a lump-sum way.
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1 Introduction
Many local air pollutants and greenhouse gases (GHG) have common sources. For example, passenger
vehicles and coal power plants emit nitrogen oxides (NOx) and carbon dioxide (CO2), which a¤ect the
local air quality and the climate. Hence, regulations directed at local air pollutants a¤ect GHG and
vice versa. Situations in which a policy aimed at one pollutant a¤ects emissions of another are referred
to as policy spillovers. These spillovers can lead to ancillary benets if they act in the same positive
direction for the environment. For instance, climate policies that cause energy e¢ ciency improvements
might lead to less fossil fuel combustion and lower emissions of local air pollutants. However, there are
also examples of climate mitigation measures that can lead to increased emissions of other pollutants.
For example, greater use of biomass in combustion sources may reduce GHG emissions but could
increase emissions of NOx and particulate matter (PM10) (see Pittel and Rübbelke 2008 for a survey).
Policy spillovers clearly have implications for policy design and cost-benet analysis, as they a¤ect
both the e¤ectiveness and cost of specic policy measures; failure to account for them increases the
cost of meeting a particular environmental objective, making it less acceptable to policymakers and
to the public. This concern is readily apparent in the case of China: climate change, largely ignored
as a problem in the past, has suddenly become a high national priority since the Chinese government
is realizing the opportunities to achieve climate mitigation through integration of GHG emissions
reductions into reductions of local pollution (Teng and Gu 2007, Qi et al. 2008). In November 2014,
China publicly pledged to peak GHG emission by 2030 and then remain steady or begin reduce the
levels. Chinas position in the international arena stems from a recognition of the need to reduce the
countrys coal dependency, due to domestic pollution. The country has boosted its investment in wind
power, the capacity of which now exceeds that of nuclear power. Green and Stern (2015) estimate
that GHG emissions in China are likely to peak by 2025, and could well peak earlier.
The spillover e¤ect of local pollution abatement on GHG emissions seems to be good news for
the climate. Yet it is not always the case. First, the spillovers might be negative in the sense that
reducing local pollution might increase (and not decrease) the cost of mitigating GHG emissions. For
instance, if instead of moving to renewable sources of energy China installs more bu¤ers on thermal
power plants, more energy is used, leading to higher CO2 emissions. Second, the spillover e¤ect might
provide perverse incentives for guiding local environmental policy. A country might strategically
choose its local regulation to be in a better position in an international deal on GHG emissions. In
particular, a country might want to modify the cost of abating GHG emissions through its choice of
local regulation in order to obtain a less stringent emission cap in a Kyoto-style agreement. Therefore,
it is crucial to understand how policies can be designed such that local pollution is reduced and global
climate mitigation e¤orts enhanced.
In this paper we analyze the interplay between climate and local pollution regulations in the pres-
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ence of policy spillovers. In particular, we analyze the question of how the choice of policy instrument
a¤ects the stringency of the policies and its e¢ ciency. In our study, we assume that in each country
there is a polluting rm that causes transboundary and local pollution. Pollution abatement levels for
both pollutants interact in the abatement cost function of rms through economies/diseconomies of
scope. As a local regulator, a countrys objective is to minimize the sum of the damage and the abate-
ment costs of the local pollutant, whereas the global regulator is charged with maximizing aggregate
welfare. Each regulator inuences the behavior of the polluter with respect to pollution abatement by
means of a variety of regulatory instruments (e.g., cost-e¢ cient non-tradable quotas and taxes). These
regulations can be designed either simultaneously or sequentially. In such a setting, each regulators
policy has the potential to a¤ect the other regulators welfare. However, as we show in the paper,
whether or not that happens depends on the type of policies chosen by the regulators.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst study that analyzes the e¤ects of the choice of
policy instruments under policy spillovers and regulation of multiple pollutants. Our paper relates
to various literatures. For example, it builds on the literature on regulation of multiple pollutants
when those pollutants interact in abatement costs or environmental damages (see, e.g., Moslener and
Requate 2007, Burtraw et al. 2012, Ambec and Coria 2013, Fullerton and Karney 2014, Antoniou and
Kyriakopoulou 2015, and Stanlund and Son 2015). Most of such literature compares the e¢ ciency of
several instruments designed by one regulator who is in charge of the two pollutants or only one (the
regulation of the other pollutant being exogenous). In contrast, we deal with two regulators, each of
them in charge of a di¤erent pollutant since our focus is on policy spillovers. Hence, we are able to
characterize the additional sources of ine¢ ciency that might arise due to multigovernance of pollution
control.
Our paper also relates to the literature on environmental federalism, which attempts to nd the
socially optimal assignment of environmental policy to the di¤erent tiers of government. Centralized
decision-making can better exploit economies of scale in the provision of public goods, and can better
internalize spillovers across local jurisdictions (e.g., Williams 1966, Oates and Schwab 1988, Gordon
1983, Williams III 2012). In such literature, researchers consider only one pollutant that di¤uses
imperfectly across states. In contrast, our analysis considers two pollutants: one local and one global.
Our focus is not on what level of government should optimally regulate pollution, but on the interplay
between regulation of local pollution at the state or country level and regulation of global pollution
at the federal or international level.
Our paper also contributes to the literature on countriesstrategies under the expectation of future
climate agreements.1 For instance, Beccherle and Tirole (2011) show that delaying binding climate
1Previous studies have also analyzed the strategic implications of policy spillovers for participation in international
climate agreements (see, e.g., Finus and Rübbelke 2013). They nd that in the presence of ancillary benets, the
relative importance of an international agreement for climate protection is reduced since ancillary benets already
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change agreements will induce countries not only to engage in suboptimal e¤orts to reduce their current
emissions but also to commit to higher pollution levels post-negotiations. In the same vein, Harstad
(2015) points out that future climate negotiations hold up countries investments in R&D related
to GHG abatement technologies, thereby leading to underinvestment. Our paper identies further
ine¢ ciencies due to countriesstrategic behavior when a future climate agreement is expected: the
ones related to local air pollution. They arise when a global target for GHG reduction is implemented
through cost-e¢ cient abatement quotas: countries distort the stringency of local pollution regulation
to obtain lower abatement obligations in the future climate agreement. The departure from rst-
best regulation depends on the economies or diseconomies of scope parameter; countries under-abate
(over-abate) local air pollution when there are economies (diseconomies) of scope between abatement
on global and local pollution in order to increase the marginal cost of abating the global pollutant
and thus to reduce the abatement quota. Such a strategic manipulation of local environmental policy
does not arise when the GHG reduction is implemented through emission taxes provided that the tax
is collected and redistributed to countries by an international organization in a lump-sum way. When
the tax on emissions is levied and kept by the country, we end up with the same distortion on local
air pollution as with quotas. In such case, a country does not internalize the impact of its choice of
regulation stringency on global welfare through abatement costs. This result goes against Weitzmans
(2014) argument that taxing emissions to resolve the global warming problem is better than a cap-
and-trade system because a country has a self-interest in collecting taxes. In our framework with
policy spillovers between local and global air pollution, the rst-best outcome can be reached with
cap-and-trade but not with a tax if countries are assigned the revenue from taxing global pollution in
a non-lump-sum way.
Finally, our paper is also related to the literature on common agency and coordination.2 A basic
assumption of this literature is that the various regulatory agencies are only able to contract in their
own sphere of responsibilities. As a result, the regulation implemented is a Nash or Stackelberg
equilibrium among various regulations o¤ered in a decentralized way. Under this complex structure,
the regulatory process introduces allocative ine¢ ciencies since an individual regulator does not take
other regulations into account when designing his own regulation. Within this literature, the closest
paper to ours is Baron (1985). He analyzes a model where the Environmental Protection Agency,
acting as a Stackelberg leader, regulates pollution, and a public utility commission regulates the price
for a monopolist that has private information about the e¤ectiveness of its abatement alternatives. In
the resulting noncooperative equilibrium, pollution control is carried beyond the rst best and output
is too low. E¢ ciency improvements in this setting would arise from direct cooperation between the
provide incentives for protection in a non-cooperative setting.
2Common agency games with complete information were introduced by Bernheim and Whinston (1996). See Mar-
timort (1996) for a review of the literature.
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EPA and the commission, from Coasian bargaining between them, or from an authority with the power
to impose a policy that balances consumer, pollutee, and producer interests. In line with Barons
(1985) results, we nd that when the global regulator is charged with maximizing aggregate welfare,
optimality is achieved regardless of the choice of policy instruments either when both regulators move
simultaneously or the global regulator moves rst. Hence, our results indicate that timing only matters
when the global regulation is implemented through quotas. In such case, simultaneous regulation leads
to rst best while the outcomes of sequential regulation depend on who moves rst. In particular,
if the local regulator moves rst, the outcome is ine¢ cient: countries will under-abate or over-abate
local pollution and there will be too little abatement of the global pollutant.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the model. It also characterizes pollution
abatements for both pollutants absent any international obligation on global pollution and the rst-
best outcome for a given target on global pollution. Section 3 analyses the impact of several policy
instruments on pollution: abatement quotas (or emission caps), emission taxes, and tradable emission
allowances. Section 4 investigates the robustness of our results to the existence of a dominant country
that has a large impact on global pollution. Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Main assumptions
We have a continuum of countries (or local regulators). In each country there is a polluting rm
that causes transboundary and local pollution. Firms can jointly reduce the local pollutant (denoted
pollutant 1) and the global pollutant (denoted pollutant 2). The total cost of reducing emissions is
denoted C(q1; q2; !), where qi denotes pollution abatement in pollutant i for i = 1; 2. We have that
C(q1; q2; !) is increasing and convex in both arguments: Ci > 0 and Cii > 0 _ i = 1; 2 where Ci and
Cii denote the rst and second derivatives with respect to qi. We assume the following quadratic and
symmetric functional form:
C(q1; q2; !) =
mq21
2
+
mq22
2
+ !q1q2:
The parameter ! measures the degree to which there are economies or diseconomies of scope in joint
abatement in each country. Formally, there are economies of scope if C(q1; q2; !) < C(q1;0; !) +
C(0; q2;!), which happens with our functional form if and only if ! < 0. There are diseconomies
of scope if the reverse holds. We refer to economies (diseconomies) of scope as complementarity
(substitutability). Hence, if ! < 0 (! > 0), the two pollutants are complements (substitutes) in the
cost function in the sense that reducing emissions of one pollutant decreases (increases) the total (and
marginal) cost of reducing emissions of the other. The spillover parameter ! is distributed in the range

  [!; !] according to a probability density f(!) and cumulative F (!) where dF (!) = f(!)d!, and
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f(!) > 0 for every ! 2 
. Moreover, we assume m > 0, m2 !2 > 0 to ensure increasing and strictly
convex marginal costs.3
Let a countrybenet from reducing emissions be denoted
B(q1(!); Q2) = a1q1(!)  b1
2
[q1(!)]
2
+ a2Q2   b2
2
[Q2]
2
;
where Q2 is the aggregate level of abatement of pollutant 2:
Q2 =
Z !
!
q2(!)dF (!): (1)
We assume that B(q1(!); Q2) is increasing and concave in its main arguments, i.e., Bi > 0 and Bii  0
for i = 1; 2. Countries di¤er only in the interaction parameter ! in the cost function.
Before examining regulatory instruments, let us analyze pollution abatement in two cases: without
any international agreement or regulation on global pollution and under the cost-e¢ cient solution for
a given global abatement target.
2.2 Pollution abatement without international regulation of global pollu-
tion
In the absence of any commitment at the international level for pollutant 2, each country ! chooses
the abatement levels q1(!) and q2(!) that maximize own welfare B(q1(!); Q2)   C(q1(!); q2(!); !)
subject to the non-negativity constraints on abatement qi(!)  0 for i = 1; 2 with Q2 dened in (1).
With ei denoting the Langrangian multiplier associated with the non-negative constraint on qi(!) for
i = 1; 2, we obtain the following rst-order conditions:
B1(q
e
1(!); Q
e
2) = C1(q
e
1(!); q
e
2(!); !)  e1;
B2(q
e
1(!); Q
e
2)
dQ2
dq2(!)
= C2(q
e
1(!); q
e
2(!); !)  e2;
plus the complementary slackness conditions derived from the two non-negativity constraints. First,
we have dQ2
dq2(!)
= 0 because a countrys abatement has a negligible impact on the aggregate abatement
of the global pollutant Q2. Second, our assumptions ensure an interior solution for local abatement:
qe1(!) > 0 for every ! 2 
 and therefore e1 = 0. Hence, with our functional forms, the rst-order
conditions become:
a1   b1qe1(!) = mqe1(!) + !qe2(!); (2)
0 = mqe2(!) + !q
e
1(!)  e2: (3)
3That is, Ci (q1; q2; !) > 0, Cii(q1; q2; !) > 0, and CiiCjj Cij2 > 0 for any qi 2 [0; eei ] for i; j = 1; 2 and i 6= j, where
eei is the uncontrolled level of emissions. Similar assumptions on the cost function are used by Stranlund and Son (2015),
Ambec and Coria (2013), Burtraw et al. (2012), and Moslener and Requate (2007), who study the optimal regulation
of multiple pollutants.These assumptions imply that the second-order conditions of the maximization programs hold.
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A country equalizes the marginal benet of abating each pollutant to its marginal cost, which depends
on both pollutants through the interaction parameter !. The marginal cost is net of e2 (which is the
implicit cost of the non-negativity constraint for the global pollutant). Therefore, even if the marginal
benet of abating the global pollutant is zero, a country might want to reduce global pollution because
it reduces the cost of abating local pollution. However, this turns out to be the case if and only if
! < 0, i.e., under economics of scope in abatement. Indeed, if e2 > 0, then q
e
2(!) = 0 and (3) becomes
!qe1(!) = 
e
2 which is compatible with q
e
1(!) > 0 if and only if ! > 0. In this case, we know by
equation (2) that abatement of local pollution is:
qe1(!) =
a1
b1 +m
:
In contrast, when ! < 0, we have 2 = 0 and thus (3) becomes qe2(!) =   !mqe1(!), which, combined
with (2), leads to:
qe1(!) =
a1m
mb1 +m
2   !2 ; (4)
and
qe2(!) =
 a1!
mb1 +m
2   !2 : (5)
Therefore, total abatement of global pollution in the absence of any international agreement on global
pollution is:
Qe2 =
Z 0
!
qe2(!)dF (!) =
Z 0
!
 a1!
mb1 +m
2   !2 dF (!):
This is to say, even in the absence of a regulation on global pollution there will be some positive level of
abatement since countries for which local and global abatement are complements freely choose to abate
global pollution only because it reduces the cost of abating local pollution. Empirical studies have
shown that the existence of ancillary benets of climate change mitigation might lead to signicant
reductions of global pollution. For instance, Parry et al. (2014) estimate that the existence of ancillary
benets of climate mitigation should lead the top 20 emitters to unilaterally (and without a need to
wait for global regulations) reduce their GHG emissions by 13.5 percent (which implies a 10.8 percent
reduction in global emissions).
2.3 The regulated solution with an exogenous global pollution target
We examine cost-e¢ cient abatement e¤orts for both pollutants for a given abatement target for global
pollution Q2. We refer to this target as rst best even though the target Q2 is exogenous and therefore
it may be ine¢ cient (though it is endogenized later in Section 3.3). As shown later, Q2 is higher than
the unregulated aggregate abatement Qe2.
Given Q2, the optimal allocation of abatement e¤orts fq1(!); q2(!)g!2
 maximizes the expected
total welfare: Z !
!

B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); q2(!); !)

dF (!);
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subject to the non-negativity constraints qj(!)  0 for j = 1; 2 and the target constraint:Z !
!
q2(!)dF (!)  Q2:
The Langrangian of the above program is:
L =
Z !
!

B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); q2(!); !) + k

Q2   q2(!)

+ 1q1(!) + 

2q2(!)

dF (!);
where k denotes the multiplier associated with the target constraint and i the multiplier associated
with the non-negativity constraint for pollutant i for i = 1; 2. With fq1(!); q2(!)g!2
 denoting the
solution to the program, we obtain the following rst-order conditions:
B1(q

1(!); Q2) = C1(q

1(!); q

2(!); !)  1;
k = C2(q1(!); q

2(!); !)  2;
for every ! 2 
. For the local pollutant, the marginal benet of abatement should be equal to
the marginal cost (net of the shadow value of the non-negativity constraints) in each country !.
For the global pollutant, marginal abatement costs (net of the shadow value of the non-negativity
constraints) should be equal among countries and equal to the shadow value of the target. This is
to say, the target Q2 should be decomposed into individual abatement e¤orts q2(!) per country to
satisfy the equimarginal principle.
Assume an interior solution for abatement of the two pollutants so that the non-negativity con-
straints are not binding and 1 = 

2 = 0 (the assumption of interior solution is discussed later).
Substituting the functional forms for abatement benets and costs, we obtain:
a1   b1q1(!) = mq1(!) + !q2(!);
k = mq2(!) + !q

1(!);
for every ! 2 
. This leads to:
q1(!) =
a1m  !k
mb1 +m
2   !2 ; (6)
q2(!) =
k [b1 +m]  a1!
mb1 +m
2   !2 ; (7)
for every ! 2 
. For ! = 0, i.e., no interaction between the two pollutants, equations (6) and (7)
simplify to q1(0) =
a1
b1 +m
and q2(0) =
k
m . Thus, the abatement e¤ort in the local pollutant q

1(!)
does not depend on the global pollution target Q2. For ! 6= 0; it does. A higher global target Q2 means
a higher common marginal cost k to reach this target, which impacts the marginal cost of abating
the local pollutant. If the two pollutants are complements, i.e., ! < 0, it becomes cheaper to abate
pollutant 1 so q1(!) increases. Reversely, if pollutants are substitutes, meaning ! > 0, abatement
of global pollution makes abatement of local pollution more expensive. Thus, q1(!) decreases with a
higher target Q2.
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As shown in appendix A, for a given global emissions target, abatement of both pollutants decreases
with ! regardless of its sign. In particular, for two interaction parameters !  and !+ of the same
magnitude j!+j = j! j but di¤erent sign !+ > 0 > ! , cost-e¢ cient abatement is always higher for
both pollutants when they are complements rather than substitutes: q1(!
 ) > q1(!
+) and q2(!
 ) >
q2(!
+). This is because the equimarginal principle requires more abatement from countries with
the lowest abatement cost and therefore with the lowest !. Hence more abatement is required from
countries where pollutants are complements than from countries where pollutants are substitutes.
Before examining environmental regulations, we discuss the assumption of an interior solution
for abatement in the cost-e¢ cient solution. Comparing (4) and (6) shows that the non-negative
constraint is binding when ! > ma1
k . It might hold when the two pollutants are substitutes and
the target global abatement level Q2 is high (so that k is high compared to !). In this case, the
global pollution abatement target is so high that abatement of local pollution becomes too costly
and, therefore, q1(!) = 0 for every ! >
ma1
k . Symmetrically, comparing (5) and (7) indicates that
q2(!) = 0 whenever ! >
k
a1 [b1+m]: abatement of the global pollutant is too costly. Let us assume that
!  min
n
ma1
k ;
k
a1 [b1 +m]
o
to guarantee an interior solution in which abatement of both pollutants
is required in the cost-e¢ cient solution. Similarly, for expositional convenience, we assume that the
conditions for an interior solution in abatement are met throughout the rest of the paper.
3 Local regulation in the shadow of future global regulation
We analyze a country´s or local regulators pollutant 1 abatement e¤ort under the expectation that
the global pollutant 2 will be regulated later on. The choice of instrument and its stringency is
exogenous and perfectly forecasted by local regulators.4 We consider two regulatory instruments
aimed to implement the same global target on emission abatement Q2: emission caps at the country
level (Section 3.1) and a tax on emissions (Section 3.2). Note that emission caps e(!) can be expressed
in terms of abatement and therefore referred to as abatement quotas, i.e., e2(!) = ee2(!) q2(!), where
ee2(!) denotes uncontrolled emissions of the global pollutant and q2(!) represents the abatement quota
for every ! 2 
. In what follows, we consider successively the cost-e¢ cient abatement quotas and a
uniform abatement quota. We also examine tradable emission allowances and discuss the assignment
of the revenue from taxing emissions. Next, we endogenize the emission abatement target in Section
3.3.
4A related study is Burtraw et al. (2012), who analyze the choice of policy instruments faced by an environmental
regulator of a specic pollutant who anticipates subsequent regulation by a di¤erent regulator of another pollutant
resulting from the same production process. Unlike our study, they assume that there is uncertainty regarding the
choice of instrument and the stringency of the global regulation.
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3.1 Abatement quotas
The global regulator commits to assign country-specic abatement quotas based on a cost-e¢ cient
allocation of the global abatement target. Given the timing of regulation, cost-e¢ ciency is achieved
ex post: after each country has set its own regulation on the local pollutant. This is to say, the global
abatement target Q2 is split into local e¤orts q2(!) in a way to equalize marginal cost of abatement
of the global pollutant 2 given the choice of abatement for local pollutant q1(!). Formally, q2(!) is
such that:
C2(q1(!); q2(!); !) = k; (8)
for every ! 2 
, where k is a shadow cost of meeting the global abatement target Q2 with
Q2 =
Z !
!
q2(!)dF (!):
The equimarginal principle (8) links abatement of both pollutants in a country to the marginal cost
of meeting the target.5
Expecting that q2(!) will be set such that condition (8) holds, a country of type ! 2 
 chooses
the abatement e¤ort for local pollution q1(!) that maximizes its own welfare dened by:
max
q1(!)
B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); q2(!); !); (9)
subject to the future global regulation in equation (8). Denoted q1(!), the regulation of local pollution
satises the following rst-order condition:6
B1(q1(!); Q2) = C1(q1(!); q2(!); !) + C2(q1(!); q2(!); !)
dq2(!)
dq1(!)
: (10)
The marginal benet of abating pollutant 1 should be equal to its marginal cost, which is decomposed
into two terms: a direct cost (the rst term on the right-hand side) and an indirect cost (the second
term on the right-hand side). The indirect cost quanties the impact of the local regulation on
the marginal abatement cost of meeting the future quota on global abatement. It depends on how
local regulation a¤ects the future abatement quota and the marginal cost of meeting the quota. The
impact of local regulation on the future global abatement quota can be found by di¤erentiating the
equimarginal principle in equation (8):
dq2(!)
dq1(!)
=  C12(q1(!); q2(!); !)
C22(q1(!); q2(!); !)
: (11)
Since marginal abatement costs are convex, C22 < 0 and the denominator is always negative. There-
fore, how q2(!) varies with q1(!) depends on the sign of the cross derivative C12. If C12 < 0, then
5Note that k and k di¤er for the same target Q2 when q2(!) 6= q2(!) because, as we show later, the marginal costs
of abating pollutant 2 are not the same.
6Recall that we assume an interior solution. The non-negativity constraint on abatement can therefore be ignored.
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the variation is positive: a more stringent local regulation leads to more abatement of global pollu-
tion. The cross derivative being negative corresponds to complement pollutants. In this case, the two
regulations are strategic complements: a more stringent regulation of local pollution leads to a more
stringent regulation on global pollution. The indirect e¤ect of marginal cost is then positive as more
abatement of local pollution increases the marginal cost of abating global pollution.
Reversely, C12 > 0 in case of substitute pollutants. The variation is then negative: a more
stringent local regulation leads to less abatement of global pollution. The two regulations are strategic
substitutes. The indirect e¤ect on marginal cost is then negative because abatement of local regulation
reduces the marginal cost of abating global pollution.
To sum-up, the indirect e¤ect of local regulation on pollution abatement through future global
abatement depends on whether the two pollutants are complements or substitutes in abatement cost.
This determines whether regulations are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. The indirect
e¤ect increases the costs of abating the local pollutant if pollutants are complements and decreases
the costs if they are substitutes.
Using our functional form, equation (11) simplies to:
dq2(!)
dq1(!)
=
 !
m
: (12)
One more unit of local pollution abatement modies the countrys abatement of global pollution by
 !
m . It leads to an increase of abatement q2(!) if ! < 0. Reversely, less abatement q2(!) is required
for the country ! when ! > 0.
Substituting (10) and solving for q1(!) with the functional forms, we obtain:
q1(!) =
ma1
mb1 +m
2   !2 ; (13)
for every ! 2 
. Using (13), we obtain abatement levels for global pollution:
q2(!) =
k
m
  a1!
mb1 +m
2   !2 : (14)
Note that the abatement quota is always binding even with economies of scope in abatement
e¤orts. Indeed, when ! < 0, q2(!) can be expressed as a function of the unregulated abatement e¤ort
on global pollutant qe2(!) as:
q2(!) =
k
m
+ qe2(!):
Hence, q2(!) > qe2(!) for every ! 2 
 as long as the global abatement cap is binding so that k > 0.
Comparing (13) with (6), we obtain the departure from the cost-e¢ cient solution with the same
target Q2 for every country type ! 2 
:
q1(!)  q1(!) =
!k
mb1 +m
2   !2 :
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With no interaction between the two pollutants ! = 0, a country cannot inuence the choice of future
quota on global pollution through its actual choice of local regulation. Hence, the two abatement
e¤orts coincide, i.e., q1(0) = q1(0) =
a1
b1 +m
. With interaction between the two pollutants ! 6= 0,
the departure depends on both the sign and the magnitude of the interaction parameter !. Local
pollution is under-abated q1(!) < q1(!) when pollutants are complements ! < 0 and over-abated
q1(!) > q

1(!) when they are substitutes ! > 0. When pollutants are complements, the country
reduces the regulation stringency for local pollution to avoid being assigned a more stringent global
abatement quota. Reversely, with substitute pollutants, the country would be assigned a less stringent
quota if it increases abatement of local pollution. Moreover, the strategic e¤ect of domestic regulation
on the future quota on abatement of global pollution increases with the magnitude of the interaction
parameter ! since the departure from the cost-e¢ cient solution increases with the absolute value of !.7
Furthermore, the departure from the cost-e¢ cient solution is higher for a more stringent global target
Q2 as the di¤erence between q1(!) and q1(!) increases with the shadow value of the cost-e¢ cient
solution k.
Note that the same outcome would be achieved if the local pollutant were regulated with a tax
on emissions 1(!) rather than a quota q1(!) for each country ! 2 
. Since the tax is levied by the
country itself, it does not show up in its objective function; it is paid by rms but redistributed to
local rms or consumers. In this case, the tax rate that maximizes country !s welfare satises the
following rst-order condition:
B1(q

1 (!); Q2)
dq1 (!)
d1
= C1(q

1 (!); q2(!); !)
dq1 (!)
d1
+ C2(q

1 (!); q2(!); !)
dq2(!)
dq1 (!)
dq1 (!)
d1
;
which, after simplifying, boils down to the condition (10).
We thus are able to enunciate a rst result.
Proposition 1 Under di¤erentiated abatement quotas for global pollution, countries over-abate local
pollution compared with the cost-e¢ cient abatement if pollutants are substitutes and under-abate local
pollution if pollutants are complements.
Hence, the way abatement of global pollution is shared among countries does impact the stringency
of local pollution regulation when the two pollutants interact in abatement cost. Here it is done in
a cost-e¢ cient way ex post, i.e., once the regulation on local pollution has been designed. Since the
stringency of the local regulation impacts the marginal cost of abating the global pollutant, countries
inuence their assigned abatement quota q2(!) by modifying the abatement cost. By increasing the
marginal cost of abating the global pollutant, a country is required to abate less. Marginal cost is
7Formally, di¤erentiating q1(!) q1(!) with respect to ! leads to
k

mb1 +m
2 + !2

mb1 +m
2   !22 > 0. Therefore, q1(!) q1(!)
is increasing in ! when ! is positive and q1(!)  q1(!) is decreasing with ! when ! is negative.
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increased (decreased) with more abatement of the local pollutant when pollutants are substitutes
(complements). Therefore, a country over-abates local pollution when pollutants are substitutes and
under-abates when they are complements.
As mentioned in the introduction, this result is related to the literature on countriesstrategies
under the expectation of a future climate agreement, which studies how pre-negotiation policy decisions
are made with an eye on the future negotiations. For instance, Beccherle and Tirole (2011) make the
point that unilaterally abating GHG emissions puts a country in a bad position for future negotiations.
Similarly, Harstad (2015) shows that future climate change deals deter innovation since countries hold
upon their R&D investment e¤orts. In our paper, the stringency of the local regulation causes similar
e¤ects: if the global and local pollutants are complements (substitutes) in abatement, the countries
put themselves in a bad position for future negotiations by increasing (decreasing) the abatement
of the local pollutant. Hence, with regards to the cost-e¤ective abatement e¤orts, they under-abate
(over-abate) the local pollutant in order to strengthen their positions.
For global pollution, the departure from cost-e¢ cient abatement with quotas in a given country !
can be computed as the di¤erence between (7) and (14):
q2(!)  q2(!) =

k   k mb1 +m2  k!2
m

mb1 +m
2   !2 : (15)
It is decomposed into two terms in the numerator. The rst term is the same for all countries regardless
of ! and depends on k   k, which is the di¤erence between the marginal costs under di¤erentiated
quotas and the cost-e¢ cient solution. It is strictly positive because marginal costs are by denition
minimized under the cost-e¢ cient solution (and the two solutions di¤er as long as ! > 0 for some
! 2 
). The second term is negative and depends on the magnitude of ! but not on its sign. Since
both abatements quota q2(!) and q2(!) sum up to the same target, it should dominate the rst term
for large ! countries. This means that countries whose ! is large in absolute terms will under-abate
compared with the rst best. In contrast, countries whose ! is close to zero will be asked to over-abate
global pollution, because then q2(!)  q2(!)  k k

m > 0.
Using (15), we can compute the threshold absolute value of ! for which the two abatement levels
coincide:
~! =
s
[k   k] mb1 +m2
k
:
We thus have shown the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Under di¤erentiated abatement quotas on global pollution, there exists a threshold ~!
on the cost interaction parameter ! that denes whether countries under-abate or over-abate global
pollution compared with the cost-e¢ cient solution: they over-abate if j!j < ~! and under-abate if
j!j > ~!.
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When global pollution is expected to be regulated under di¤erentiated quotas that minimize abate-
ment costs, countries strategically regulate their local pollution to impact their future quota. This
strategic e¤ect reduces e¢ ciency and thus increases the abatement cost of reaching a given global
emission target. Those who su¤er the most from this increased cost are countries with a low interac-
tion parameter because they are asked to abate more than with the cost-e¢ cient solution. Countries
with a high interaction parameter benet from the strategic e¤ect: they manage to get less stringent
abatement quotas than the cost-e¢ cient solution.
Before moving on to emission tax, we want to stress that this strategic e¤ect of environmental
regulation arises because abatement quotas are assigned cost-e¢ ciently. The e¤ect would disappear
if the assignment rule were unrelated to abatement costs, for instance with abatement quotas dened
per capita or GDP. If in our model, emission reductions per capita were to be the same, each country
would abate the same, dened as q2(!) = Q2 for every ! 2 
.8 In such a case, countries would
take the abatement of global pollution as given and the local regulation would be set at an e¢ cient
level, i.e., by equalizing the marginal benet of abatement to its marginal cost. However, the cost
of achieving the target Q2 would not be minimized as abatement costs are not equalized. Yet the
relative performance of these two second-best policies is not obvious.
As shown in Appendix B, countries for which pollutants are substitutes would prefer di¤erentiated
quotas as in such case they obtain more abatement of local pollution and less abatement of global
pollution. In contrast, countries for which pollutants are complements are better o¤ with uniform
quotas.
3.2 Tax on global pollution and tradable emissions permits
Let us assume that the global regulator commits to achieve the same global abatement Q2 with a
(uniform) tax 2 on emissions of the global pollutant 2 instead of abatement quotas. Abatement levels
q2 (!) will be such that rms equalize the marginal abatement cost for the global pollutant to the tax
rate in every country ! 2 
:
C2(q1(!); q

2 (!); !) = 2: (16)
Importantly, assume further that a countrys emissions do not impact its share of revenue collected
from taxing emissions, e.g., the revenue is shared equally among countries or redistributed according
to a rule that does not depend on emissions. Let us rst assume that countries set quantity targets
for abatement of local pollution, e.g. emission caps. Country ! chooses the abatement e¤ort q1(!)
that maximizes its benet net of abatement cost and tax payments:
B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); q2 (!); !)  2 [ee2(!)  q2 (!)] ; (17)
8Recall that, with a continuum of countries of mass one, total abatement Q2 is also the average abatement level.
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where q2 (!) satises (16) for every ! 2 
. The rst-order condition yields:
B1(q1(!); Q2) = C1(q1(!); q

2 (!); !) + [C2(q1(!); q

2 (!); !)  2]
dq2 (!)
dq1(!)
: (18)
Country ! chooses the abatement e¤ort such that the marginal benet of abating pollution equals its
marginal cost. The marginal cost is composed of the direct (rst right-hand side term) and indirect
(second right-hand side term) e¤ects of a future choice of global pollution abatement q2 (!). Now,
however, one more unit of global pollution abatement q2 (!) has two impacts: it increases the marginal
abatement cost and reduces tax payments. The two impacts cancel out since the global abatement
target will be chosen such that the marginal abatement cost of each country C2(q1(!); q2 (!); !) equals
the tax rate 2. Thus, the rst-order condition (18) leads to the cost-e¢ cient condition in every country
! 2 
:
B1(q1(!); Q2) = C1(q1(!); q

2 (!); !): (19)
Hence, for a given global cap Q2, the cost-e¢ cient outcome is implemented with a tax on global
pollution of 2 = k per unit of emission. Such a tax rate would lead each country ! 2 
 to implement
an abatement quota q1(!). The rm in country ! binds the quota by abating q

1(!). Moreover, each
country will choose abatement q2(!) such that the marginal cost of abatement equalizes the tax rate
2. We thus obtain the cost-e¢ cient abatement levels of both of the local and global pollutants.
The cost-e¢ cient outcome can also be achieved if the local pollutant is regulated with a tax on
emissions 1 rather than a quota on abatement. The tax rate implemented by a country of type
! maximizes the same objective as in (17). The choice of abatement of local pollution satises the
following rst-order condition:
B1(q1(!); Q2)
dq1(!)
d1
= C1(q1(!); q

2 (!); !)
dq1(!)
d1
+ [C2(q1(!); q

2 (!); !)  2]
dq2(!)
d1
;
which, after decomposing dq

2 (!)
d1
=
dq2 (!)
dq1(!)
 dq1(!)
d1
and simplifying, boils down to the e¢ ciency
condition (19).
It is worth mentioning that the revenue from taxing emissions of global pollution should not be
assigned to the country hosting the polluting rm. Otherwise, the payment of the tax disappears from
the local regulators objective in (17) (last term). The tax would then be missing in the rst-order
condition (18) which determines regulation stringency of the local pollutant. The rst-order condition
(18) would then become similar to condition (10) and, therefore, we end up with the same distortion in
regulation stringency as with cost-e¢ cient di¤erentiated abatement quotas. We thus conclude that to
obtain e¢ ciency, each country should pay for the externality its activities generate on global pollution
through emission taxes.
Finally, the cost-e¢ cient outcome can also be achieved by using tradable emission permits rather
that taxing the global pollutant. The intuition is similar as for the tax instrument. Assume that each
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country or rm is assigned l2(!) units of tradable emission allowances. Denote by qt2(!) the level of
abatement e¤ort of the rm in country ! for every ! 2 
. The initial allocation of permits must
achieve the target reduction of global pollution:
Q2 =
Z !
!
[ee2(!)  l2(!)] dF (!) =
Z !
!
qt2(!)dF (!); (20)
where the last equality is due to the permit market-clearing condition. The rm in country ! chooses
abatement levels denoted qt2(!) = e
e
2(!)  l2(!) to equalize the marginal abatement cost for the global
pollutant to the equilibrium price of permits in every country ! 2 
:
C2(q1(!); q
t
2(!); !) = p2: (21)
Country !s objective when choosing abatement e¤ort q1(!) now includes the net position of rms in
the permit market:
B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); qt2(!); !)  p2

ee2(!)  l2(!)  qt2(!)

; (22)
where qt2(!) and p2 satisfy (21) for every ! 2 
 as well as the market-clearing condition (20). Since
each rm or country has a negligible impact on the price of emission allowances p2, the rst-order
condition yields:
B1(q1(!); Q2) = C1(q1(!); q
t
2(!); !) + [C2(q1(!); q
t
2(!); !)  p2]
dqt2(!)
dq1(!)
  p2 dl2(!)
dq1(!)
(23)
for every !. This rst-order condition is similar to (16) with the price of emission permits p2 instead
of the tax 2. The last term
dl2(!)
dq1(!)
captures the impact of abating local pollution on the initial
allocation of emission permits. It is nil when the initial allocation of permits is unrelated to local
pollution. In such case, the rst-order condition boils down to the e¢ ciency condition (19) since the
permit price is equal to marginal cost. Since the total number of permits is dened by the emission
target Q2, the equilibrium permit price is p2 = k. We thus obtain e¢ ciency: qti(!) = q

i (!) for every
! 2 
 and every pollutant i = 1; 2.
Yet permits might be initially allocated according to a rule that depends on local pollution abate-
ment. For instance, the allocation might be proportional to abatement costs in the sense that a country
with higher abatement costs obtains more permits. Then countries will tend to distort the stringency
of their local regulations to obtain more permits. Formally, the last term remains in the rst-order
condition, which means that abatement is not e¢ cient. Since dl2(!)dq1(!) =
!
m , it holds that countries
over-abate local pollution compared with the cost-e¢ cient abatement if pollutants are substitutes and
under-abate local pollution if pollutants are complements to obtain more permits.9
We summarize our results in the following proposition.
9The fact that rms have incentives for strategic action if allocation in one period depends on previous actions is
well know in the literature. See, e.g., Sterner and Muller (2008), who show that free allocation of permits is bound to
create problems.
16
Proposition 3 Regulations on local and global pollution are e¢ cient if the target on global pollution is
implemented by emission taxes or tradable emission permits provided that (i) the revenue from taxing
emissions are redistributed to the countries independently of emissions, and (ii) the initial allocation
of permits is not linked to abatement costs.
Unlike non-tradable di¤erentiated abatement caps, setting a tax on global pollution does not lead
to an ine¢ cient outcome. Even if the country takes into account the e¤ect of its local regulation on the
cost of abating the global pollutant, this cost is compensated by the tax saved. The tax rate reects
the social marginal cost of abatement, which is the same ex post. Therefore each country internalizes
the impact of its regulation choice on the social cost of abating the global pollutant. To internalize
this impact, the tax should be returned to countries in a non-distortionary way. Similarly, e¢ ciency
is achieved with emission permits at country level as long as the initial allocation of permits is not
inuenced by local regulation. Otherwise, a country has an interest in distorting its local regulation
to obtain more permits, as with non-tradable di¤erentiated abatement caps.
Before endogenizing the global pollution target, let us discuss the robustness of our results to
alternative regulatory timing. We show in Appendix C that e¢ ciency is achieved with cost-e¢ cient
abatement costs if both regulators (local and global) move simultaneously or if the global regulator
moves rst. This is true regardless of the policy instrument used, i.e., abatement quota, tax, or
tradable permits. Indeed, the strategic e¤ect of local environmental policy on quota abatement or
emission allowances disappears when the two pollutants are regulated simultaneously. When the global
pollutant is regulated rst, the global regulator implements a rst best abatement level because it
aims to maximize social welfare at the world level. We would obtain suboptimal regulation of global
pollution with a global regulator who ignores or disregards the damages of local pollution, for example,
because it is not in the mandate of the federal or international regulatory agency or values the welfare
of a subset of countries (for example, because not all countries join the international environmental
agreement). When it comes to taxes, Proposition 3 holds when the two regulations are designed
simultaneously or in the reverse order, i.e., global regulator moving rst.
3.3 E¢ cient future abatement target
In this section, we endogenize the choice of global emission target. Let us assume now that the
abatement target for the global pollutant Q2 is set taking into account the benet of abating global
pollution.Let Q2 and Q

2 denote the e¢ cient global abatement under di¤erentiated quotas and under
tax (or, equivalently, tradable permits), respectively. It is common knowledge among countries and
rms that abatement of the global pollutant will be set to maximize social welfare given regulations on
local pollution q1(!). The global regulator chooses abatement of the global pollutant at the country
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level q2(!) for every ! 2 
 to maximize social welfare dened by:Z !
!
[B(q1(!); Q2)  C(q1(!); q2(!); !)] dF (!); (24)
subject to Q2 =
R !
!
q2(!)dF (!). The rst-order condition leads to the equalization of marginal benet
to marginal cost for every ! 2 
:
B2(q1(!); Q2) = C2(q1(!); q2(!); !); (25)
which, with our functional forms, yields:
a2   b2Q2 = mq2(!) + !q1(!): (26)
The e¢ ciency conditions (26) are dened by di¤erent abatement levels q1(!) depending on the
instrument used to regulate the global pollutant. With di¤erentiated abatement quotas, the analysis
in Section 3.1 applies: countries set local regulations to induce abatement e¤orts q1(!) dened in
(13) for every ! 2 
. With a tax on global pollution, we already know from Section 3.2 that the
local abatement e¤orts would be cost-e¢ cient q1(!). Abatement of local pollution is then given by
equation (6) where k = a2 b2Q2 since, by denition, the global target Q2 is set at the e¢ cient level.
Combining equation (6) with k = a2   b2Q2 and (13) yields:
! [q1(!)  q1(!)] =
!2[a2   b2Q2]
mb1 +m
2   !2 ; (27)
which is strictly positive regardless of !. Integrating condition (26) for all ! 2 [!; !] leads to
Q2 =
[a2   E(!q1(!))]
b2 +m
: (28)
The global abatement target with tax Q2 is dened by equation (28) with q1(!) = q

1(!), where q

1(!)
is dened in (6). The one under quota Q2 is also dened by equation (28), but with q1(!) = q1(!),
where q1(!) is dened in (13). Using equation (27), we obtain Q2 < Q

2: aggregate abatement of the
global pollutant is lower under di¤erentiated abatement quotas than under tax. The reason is that
di¤erentiated quotas distort the stringency of local regulations, which increases the cost of abating
the global pollutant in all countries. The equalization of abatement cost to the marginal benet of
abatement leads to less abatement and thus more emissions in total than the rst best (or with taxes).
From the analysis, it also follows that since the abatement levels di¤er under the two instruments and
the tax implements the rst best, total welfare must be lower under quotas. Thus, the implementation
of non-tradable di¤erentiated abatement quotas will not only distort the stringency of local pollution
abatement but also lead to under-abatement of the global pollutant.
Proposition 4 The global abatement target is lower under di¤erentiated abatement quotas than under
tax.
18
A nal remark concerns the e¤ects of the choice of policies to implement an international climate
agreement and the incentives to deviate from it. It is well known that the lack of an e¤ective interna-
tional government vested with e¤ective coercive powers makes it unlikely that adequate participation
in and compliance with an international climate treaty will be achieved. Free-riding behavior can be
expressed through non-participation or non-compliance. As shown in Appendix D, for the countries
for which pollutants are substitutes and the absolute value of ! is large, it holds that the welfare gains
of non-compliance are larger when the agreement is implemented through taxes than through di¤eren-
tiated quotas. Thus, for those countries, the less cost-e¤ective regulation is more likely to be e¤ective
in promoting participation in and compliance with international climate agreements. Interestingly,
Barrett and Stavins (2003) reach a similar conclusion. They nd that proposals that are best in terms
of cost-e¤ectiveness (conditional on implementation) primarily market-based instruments such as
tradable permit regimes are less likely to be e¤ective in promoting participation in and compliance
with international climate agreements. In our setting, di¤erentiated non-tradable abatement quotas
provide countries for which pollutants are substitutes (and hence, which in relative terms have the
highest cost of compliance with a climate treaty) with implicit transfers through reduced abatement
responsabilities. Thus, despite the fact that taxes can reduce costs overall, di¤erentiated non-tradable
abatement quotas are most likely to induce compliance by countries with high costs.
4 Big country
Let us analyze how robust our results are to the assumption of atomistic countries. Indeed, it is well
known that the climate change problem is characterized by the existence of a few large emitters such
as China and the United States. To account for this in our model, we consider a dominant country
denoted by the superscript D. This country is responsible for a share  of global abatement. We
rst examine the case of abatement quotas that are set cost-e¢ ciently ex post with an endogenous
emission target on global pollution. The dominant country of type !D chooses an abatement level
qD1 that maximizes its welfare subject to the abatement quotas on global pollution for itself q
D
2 and
a level of global abatement for global pollution Q2 dened by Q2 = qD2 + [1  ] Q D2 , where Q D2
denotes total abatement by other countries:
Q D2 =
Z !
!
q2(!)dF (!):
In such case, the rst-order condition in (10), determining the optimal level of abatement of local
pollution, becomes:
B1(q
D
1 ;
Q2) = C1(q
D
1 ; q
D
2 ; !
D) +

B2(q
D
1 ;
Q2)  C2(qD1 ; qD2 ; !D)
 dqD2
dqD1
: (29)
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Hence, if  = 1 there will be full internalization of the global warming externality. In contrast, if
 = 0, we are back to our original case. Whenever 0 <  < 1, part of the global warning externality
is not internalized and, therefore, the outcome is ine¢ cient.
For tradable emission permits, the question naturally arises as how our results would change
in the presence of a dominant country that can manipulate the market to its own advantage by
means of its choice of abatement of the local pollutant.10 To analyze this problem, let lD2 denote the
number of emission permits freely distributed to the dominant country. Assume further that lD2 is
determined independently of abatement costs. The dominant country chooses the abatement e¤ort qD1
that maximizes the benet from local abatement net of abatement cost and payments for net permit
transactions. This yields the following rst-order condition:
B1(q
D
1 ;
Q2) = C1(q
D
1 ; q
D
2 ; !
D) +

p2   C2(qD1 ; qD2 ; !D)
 dqD2
dqD1
  dp2
dqD1

eeD2   lD2   qD2

:
This equation di¤ers from the case of atomistic countries in (10) by dp2
dqD1
which captures the impact
of the dominant countrys environmental policy on the price of permits. The price equalizes marginal
abatement costs in all countries as in (21). By summing up all those conditions for all countries, we
are able to express explicitly the price as a function of abatement levels from both the dominant and
the atomistic countries:
p2 = 

mqD2 + !
DqD1

+ [1  ]
Z !
!
mq2(!) + !q1(!)dF (!):
Di¤erentiating the above equation with respect to qD1 (!), we obtain
dp2
dqD1
= !D:
Hence, if  = 0 we are back to the e¢ ciency condition (19). Yet if  > 0, the outcome is ine¢ cient.
How it departs from e¢ ciency depends on the interaction parameter of the dominant country and
whether the dominant country is a net buyer or a net seller in the market for permits (i.e., whether
the net demand for permits eeD2   qD2 exceeds the initial allocation lD2 ). With economics of scope
!D < 0, abating local pollution reduces the price of emission permits because it decreases the cost
of abating the global pollutant. As a consequence, a net buyer dominant country over-abates local
pollution (while the reverse holds if the dominant country is a net seller of permits). Symmetrically,
with dis-economies of scope !D > 0, abating local pollution increases the price of emission permits
through higher abatement costs for global pollution. If the dominant country is a net buyer (seller) of
permits, it under-abates (over-abates) local pollution compared with the e¢ cient level. Thus, when
the dominant country is a net seller of permits, we obtain results similar to those under cost-e¢ cient
non-tradable abatement quotas described in Section 3.1. In contrast, our results indicate that a
10See Hahn (1984) for a formal analysis of such manipulation.
20
dominant country that is a net buyer of permits will over-abate (under-abate) local pollution when
pollutants are complements (substitutes) in order to reduce the price of emission permits.
5 Conclusion
Having analyzed the interplay between local and global pollution with spillovers in abatement costs, we
are able to answer the question raised in the introduction: Are the spillovers between local air pollution
and GHG emissions good news for the climate? Our analysis shows that the answer depends on several
ingredients: (i) whether e¤orts to reduce local air pollution and GHG emissions are substitutes or
complements in cost, (ii) whether GHG emissions are regulated or not at the international level, (iii)
the choice of instrument used to implement an international agreement on GHG reduction, and (iv)
the marginal impact of countries on total GHG emissions.
First, without any international obligation for GHG emissions, it is in each countrys own interest
to reduce its GHG emissions when local air pollution and GHG abatement e¤orts are complements.
Doing so, the country exploits economics of scope in pollution abatement. This is so even if each
country has a negligible impact on global GHG emissions. In contrast, when abatement e¤orts are
substitutes, countries have no self-interest in reducing GHG emissions. In fact, the regulation of local
air pollution might lead to higher GHG emissions.
Second, when GHG are regulated internationally, the choice of instrument and timing of regulation
matter. In particular, if countries expect GHG emissions to be regulated in the future through cost-
e¢ cient non-tradable emissions caps, they have an incentive to distort the stringency of their own
domestic regulation of local air pollution to obtain higher emission caps. Whether the regulation is
too stringent or not stringent enough depends on the sign of the spillover e¤ect in abatement cost. In
any case, even if the emission caps are set cost-e¢ cient ex post (once domestic regulations of local air
pollution have been implemented), they are distorted: the same target for global GHG emissions is
achieved at a higher cost. If this target is chosen to maximize social welfare, it is set too lax compared
with the rst best. In this case, the policy spillover e¤ect is bad for the climate. A similar distortion
in local air pollution arises with a tax on GHG emissions when each country keeps all the revenue
from taxing emissions within its territory. To avoid this distortion, the revenue from taxing GHG
emissions should be assigned to a country independently of its own contribution. Similarly, emission
caps or allowances should not depend on abatement costs, e.g., per capita or GDP.
Third, the strategic distortion of local regulation is mitigated for big countries that have a
signicant impact on global GHG emissions. Big GHG emitters would partly internalize how their
choice of local air pollution a¤ects GHG emissions, which undermines this strategic e¤ect. This holds
for cost-e¢ cient emission caps but not for tradable permits: a big country might distort its local air
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pollution regulation to manipulate the price of permits. How it departs from the rst best depends
on the dominant countrys abatement cost spillover and whether the country is a net buyer or a net
seller in the market for permits. For instance, we nd that a dominant country that is a net buyer of
permits will over-abate (under-abate) local pollution when pollutants are complements (substitutes)
in order to reduce the price of emission permits. In contrast, the incentives are reversed when the
dominant country is a net seller of permits.
From our analysis, we can conclude that a countrys concerned by local air pollution is good news
for the in the absence of any international obligation on GHG emissions when there are economies of
scope (or ancillary benets) in abatement costs. Furthermore, the cost interaction between abatement
local and global pollution matters for the choice of regulation instruments for GHG emissions for the
reasons explained above.
The model in this paper is simplied in a number of respects to keep the analysis tractable. For ex-
ample, we do not model a potential interaction between the two pollutants in the damage they cause.
Such an extension could be easily incorporated it in our model in line with the analysis of Ambec and
Coria (2013). In such case, the distortions would depend on the net e¤ect of the interactions between
the two pollutants in damages and costs. In addition, our analysis assume perfect information. More-
over, the economies (diseconomies) of scale are assumed to be exogenous. However, rms have private
information about their abatement costs. That is, rms know whether they are more productive
reducing one of the pollutants and, if so, to what degree. Furthermore, economies (dis-economies)
are endogenous to the choice of abatement technologies installed in response to environmental regu-
lations. Finally, moral hazard, adverse selection, and endogenous technological progress are problems
that complicate the analysis of the conicts created by non-cooperative regulations and are as such
left as areas for further research.
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A Comparison of rst-best abatements given Q2
Di¤erentiating equation (6) with respect to ! yields:
q01 (!) =
2! [a1m  !k]  k

mb1 +m
2   !2
[mb1 +m2   !2]2
: (30)
Note that a1m  !k  0 because q1(!)  0 for every ! 2 
. Further, m2   !2 > 0 by assumption.
Therefore, we can conclude that q01 (!) < 0 for every !  0 so that q1(!) is decreasing when pollutants
are complements.
Similarly, di¤erentiating equation (7) with respect to ! yields:
q02 (!) =
2! [k [b1 +m]  a1!]  a1

mb1 +m
2   !2
[mb1 +m2   !2]2
: (31)
Note that k [b1 +m] a1!  0 for every q2(!)  0. Further, m2 !2 > 0 by assumption. Therefore,
we can conclude that q02 (!) < 0 for every !  0 so that q2(!) is decreasing when pollutants are
complements.
Furthermore, for any !  and !+ such that j!+j = j! j and !+ > 0 > ! , we have q1(! ) >
q1(!
+) and q2(!
 ) > q2(!
+). Therefore, by continuity q1(!) and q

2(!) are decreasing with ! when
! > 0, i.e., when pollutants are substitutes.
B Countrys welfare comparison between cost-e¢ cient di¤er-
entiated and uniform quota
Let us compare the welfare di¤erence between uniform and di¤erentiated quotas. For simplicity, let
us assume that ! can take two values: !  and !+, where !  < 0 < !+. For a fraction  of the
countries ! = ! , and hence for the remaining fraction [1  ] it holds that ! = !+. Under a uniform
quota, the abatement of the global pollutant corresponds to qU2 = q

2(!
 ) + [1  ] q2(!+). Hence
q2(!
+) < qU2 < q

2(!
 ):
Let us compare qU2 with the abatement of the global pollutant under di¤erentiated cost-e¢ cient
quotas q2(!).
If ! = ! , we have:
q2(!
 )  qU2 =

q2(!
 )  q2(! )

+ [1  ] q2(! )  q2(!+) :
The sign of the di¤erence [q2(!
 )  q2(! )] is not straightforward. However, by Proposition 2 we
know that it is positive when j! j < e!, and hence, q2(! )   qU2 > 0: Furthermore, we know that
@q2(!)
@! < 0. Hence, q2(j! j > e!) > q2(j! j < e!) and therefore q2(! )  qU2 > 0 _ ! :
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If ! = !+, we have:
q2(!
+)  qU2 =

q2(!
+)  q2(!+)
   q2(! )  q2(!+) :
By Proposition 2 we know that q2(!
+) qU2 < 0 if j!+j > e!: Furthermore, we know that @q2(!)@! < 0.
Hence, q2(j!+j < e!) > q2(j!+j > e!) and therefore q2(!+)  qU2 > 0 _ !+.
When it comes to local pollution we know that:
q1(!)  qU1 (!) = [q1(!)  q1(!)] +

q1(!)  qU1 (!)

= !
"
k
mb1 +m2   !2 +

qU2 (!)  q2(!)

m+ b1
#
:
This expression is unambiguously positive _ !+, and hence q1(!+) > qU1 (!+). However, the compari-
son is less clear for ! : After some further calculations, and assuming that !  =  !+, this expression
can be represented as:
q1(!
 )  qU1 (! ) = ! 
"
k [m+ b1] + 2 [1  ] a1! 
mb1 +m2   [! ]2
#
:
We know that k [m+ b1]+a1!  > 0 for q2(!
 ) > 0. Therefore, we can say that q1(!
 ) < qU1 (!
 )
when   12 :
This is to say, with regards to di¤erentiated quotas, uniform quotas imply less abatement of local
pollution and more abatement of global pollution for the countries for which pollutants are substitutes.
The reverse holds for countries for which pollutants are complements. Finally, the di¤erence in welfare
between uniform and di¤erentiated quotas can be represented as W1(!), given by:
W1(!) =

qU1 (!)  q1(!)
 
a1   [b1 +m]
2

qU1 (!) + q1(!)

(32)
+
h
Q2  Q

2
i 
a2   b2
2
h
Q2 +Q

2
i
+
m
2
h
[q2(!)]
2   qU2 2i+ ! q1(!)q2(!)  qU1 (!)qU2  :
As shown in Section 3.3., Q

2 < Q

2. Moreover, when ! = 0 this expression simplies to:
W (!) =
h
Q2  Q

2
i 
a2   b2
2
h
Q2 +Q

2
i
+
m
2
h
[q2(!)]
2   qU2 2i > 0:
Finally, let us have a look at the last term. We can show that for !+ =  ! , this expression
corresponds to:
!+

q1(!
+)q2(!
+)  qU1 (!+)qU2

= !+
"
a1m

q2(!
+)  qU2

mb1 +m2   !2  

qU2 !
+

[m+ b1]

k [m+ b1] + 2 [1  ] a! 
mb1 +m2   !2
#
:
Therefore, !+

q1(!
+)q2(!
+)  qU1 (!+)qU2

< 0 if   12 . Thus, countries for which pollutants are
substitutes are in relative terms worse o¤ under uniform quotas since the rst, third and fourth term
in parentheses on the RHS of equation (32) are negative.
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C Regulatory Timing
We show that optimality is achieved either when when both regulators move simultaneously or the
global regulator moves rst regardless of the choice of policy instruments. Let us consider rst the
case of simultaneous regulation. In line with Section 3.1., the maximization problem of the global
regulator yields FOCs:
C2(q1(!); q2(!)) = bk;
for every ! 2 
, where bk is the shadow cost of reaching the target Q2 that could be equal to the rst
best level, in which case bk is the marginal benet of abating the global pollutant.
Country ! chooses an abatement quota q1(!) to maximize the net welfare dened in (9). Since
the abatement quotas are decided simultaneously, dq2(!)dq1(!) = 0 and hence equation (10) simplies to:
B1(q1; Q2) = C1(q1(!); q2(!)): (33)
Therefore, the rst best is achieved since countries choose an abatement quota q1(!) such that the
marginal benet of abating pollution equals the marginal costs and the global regulator chooses
abatement quotas q2(!) such that countries equalize their marginal cost to the marginal benet of
abating the global pollutant 2.
Let us consider now the case of sequential regulation where pollutant 2 is regulated before pollutant
1 through di¤erentiated quotas q2(!). Since country ! takes the stringency of the quota q2(!) as given,
the quota q1(!) that maximizes welfare is such that the marginal benet of abating pollution equals
the marginal costs. In contrast, the quota q2(!) that maximizes the global regulators optimization
problem satisfy the following FOC:
hbk   C2(q1(!); q2(!))i+ B1(q1; Q2)  C1(q1(!); q2(!)) dq1(!)
dq2(!)
= 0. (34)
However, since B1(q1; Q2) = C1(q1(!); q2(!)) we end up with the e¢ cient FOC. The same ar-
gument shows that the rst best is achieved with a tax on local pollution 1 rather than abatement
quotas.
Simultaneous implementation of taxes will also lead to rst best. The rm in country of type !
reacts to the tax rate  i for pollutant i by equalizing its marginal abatement cost to the tax rate for
i = 1; 2:
 i = Ci(qi; qj ; !): (35)
The global regulator chooses the tax rate 2 to maximize social welfare at the world level (24) subject
to the reaction functions dened by (35). This yields the following FOC:
[B2(q

1 ; Q2)  C2(q1 ; q2 ; !)]
dq2
d2
+ [B1(q

1 )  C1(q1 ; q2 ; !)]
dq1
d2
= 0; (36)
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As discussed in Section 3.2., the tax rate 1 that maximizes country !0s welfare satises the
following FOC:
[B1(q

1 )  C1(q1 ; q2 ; !)]
dq1
d1
  [C2(q1 ; q2 ; !)  2]
dq2
d1
= 0: (37)
Given (35), the FOC in (37) simplies to B1(q1 ) = C1(q

1 ; q

2 ; !). Hence, the FOC in (36) becomes
B2(q

1 ; Q2) = C2(q

1 ; q

2 ; !), implying that the rst best is achieved when regulators decide on the tax
levels 1(!) and 2 simultaneously.
Finally, let us consider the case when both pollutants are regulated by taxes and the global
regulator moves rst. Like in the simultaneous case, country ! chooses a tax level 1(!) such that
the marginal benet of abating pollution equals the marginal costs. In contrast, the tax level 2 that
maximizes the global regulators optimization problem satises the following FOC:
[B2(Q

2)  C2(q1 ; q2 ; !)]
dq2
d2
+ [B1(q

1 )  C1(q1 ; q2 ; !)]
dq1
d2
= 0. (38)
However, since B1(q1 ) = C1(q

1 ; q

2 ; !), this condition simplies and thus the tax 2 is set at a level
such that countries equalize their marginal cost to the the marginal benet of abating pollutant 2.
D Welfare variation from participating in an international
agreement on global pollution
We assume that a country ! that deviates from the international agreement chooses the abatement
levels qe1(!) and q
e
2(!), which maximize welfare in the absence of international regulation of global
pollution. In contrast, the global aggregate abatement corresponds to the rst best Q2 and can be
implemented through di¤erentiated abatement quotas or a carbon tax. Let WL(!) denote country
!0s welfare when deviating from the agreement. Moreover, let W (!) and W (!) denote country !0s
welfare when the agreement is implemented through di¤erentiated cost-e¢ cient abatement quotas and
taxes, respectively.
The welfare gains of deviating from an agreement that implements Q2 through taxes are larger
than the welfare gains of deviating when the agreement is implemented through quotas if:
WL(!) W (!) > WL(!) W (!): (39)
Condition (39) simplies to:
W2(!) =W (!) W (!) > 0:
Given the functions of abatement benets and costs, W2 can be represented as:
W2(!) = [q1(!)  q1(!)]

a1   [b1 +m]
2
[q1(!) + q

1(!)]

+
m
2
h
[q2(!)]
2   [q2]2
i
+! [q1(!)q

2(!)  q1(!)q2] + 2

e02(!)  q2(!)

; (40)
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which simplies to:
W2(!) =

!k
2  m [b1 +m] hk2   [k]2i+ 2mk mb1 +m2   !2 [ee2(!)  q2(!)] : (41)
Note that W2(!) is decomposed into three terms. The rst term is positive and depends on
the magnitude of ! but not on its sign. The second term is negative since the di¤erence

k   k
is strictly positive. Finally, the third term is positive since the di¤erence [ee2(!)  q2(!)] is strictly
positive for every ! 2 
. Furthermore, as shown in Appendix A, q2(!) is decreasing with ! for
every ! 2 
, implying less abatement of global pollution by the countries for which pollutants are
substitutes. In addition, the uncontrolled emissions of global pollutant ee2(!) are expected to be larger
for those countries since they do not abate at all in the absence of a global regulation. Thus, we can
conclude that W2(!) is decreasing with ! for every ! 2 
 and that it is larger for countries for
which pollutants are substitutes.
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